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The financial crisis in the last decades has become a common phenomenon. However, due to the process of globalization, 
financial markets’ integration and their interdependency, financial crisis tend to evolve and gain not only regional but also global scale. In the 
context of financial market liberalization, globalization and internalization, the subsequences caused by financial risk and financial crises 
contagion become more visible and more severe. The financial crisis that originated in one region of the world through the rapid process of 
financial markets’ globalization may spread worldwide and adversely affect other geographical regions, thus causing serious problems and 
disruption throughout the whole global financial system in the way of destabilizing it. Although it is not easy to forecast crises with high 
reliability, recently a lot of scientific researches were done on the analysis of financial crisis indicators. Early warning system of forthcoming 
crisis that uses a lot of different economical and financial indicators can indeed be a useful tool for preparation for the coming financial 
crisis, for evaluating subsequences of crisis to a country’s economy and for assessing the impact of financial crisis future vulnerabilities. In 
the article all the financial crisis indicators which are presented in scientific literature are examined systemically and classified into four main 
groups. The main finding is that all the financial crisis indicators differ in their significance on financial crisis contagion. Moreover, all 
indicators and their observance simultaneously let both academics and politicians to evaluate the current economic situation and to determine 
if a country is struck by financial crisis or not. By using system of financial crisis indicators it could help to detect contagion at an earlier 
stage and help to prepare for the forthcoming crisis and to prevent from huge losses when the financial crisis hits. After all, the knowing of 
financial crisis contagion indicators system could be extremely valuable in developing appropriate financial risk management strategies. 
Key words: financial crisis, financial risk, financial contagion, contagion channel, financial crisis indicators, financial integration, 
financial markets. 





For a long time economists have believed that financial systems are fragile in the sense that small 
shocks can cause serious disruption. Research has focused on phenomena, such as bank runs, which affect the 
stability of individual institutions. Only recently there has been interest in the phenomenon of contagion, in 
which financial distress in one institution or one sector of the financial system spreads to other institutions or 
sectors. In the last decade internationalization and financial integration have increased the possibility of financial 
contagion among emerging and developed countries. Emerging markets have experienced a variety of financial 
crises over the past 20 years. The crises in Mexico in 1987, in South-East Asia in 1997 and Russia in 1998 have 
provoked speculation that financial crises have spread from one country to another. These financial crises were 
initiated by episodes of ‘local’ turmoil but ultimately spilled over to markets with little or no economic linkages 
to those initial shocks. This has been described as contagion or interdependence. In scientific literature 
explaining financial crisis origin, contagion is describes as a phenomenon that occurs when a shock to one or a 
group of markets, countries, or institutions, spread to other markets, countries, or institutions. The recent 
financial crisis, which began in 2007 in the Unites States, has proven the existence of contagion phenomena once 
again. Without a clear understanding of financial contagion and the mechanisms through which it works, we can 
neither assess the problem nor design appropriate policy measures to control it.  
A poor understanding of the transmission of economic and financial crises has in the past few years 
prompted a surge of interest in international economic integration and its relationship to international financial 
contagion. The debate on the relative importance of trade linkages versus financial flows continues to be 
unresolved. A number of recent articles (Bae et al, 2003; Kaminsky & Reinhart, 2003; Pritsker, 2004; Clark et al, 
2009; Cheung et al, 2010) have emphasized the importance of financial sector links in the propagation of crises 
across countries, while others (Claessens, 2001; Abeysinghe & Forbes, 2002; Rigobon, 2002; Kali & Reyes, 
2009; Abd Majid & Hj Kassim, 2009) have stressed the importance of trade linkages. However, both strands of 
research note that it is difficult to separate the two because most countries that are linked in trade are also linked 
in finance.  
Thus the main issue in scientific field is to analyze the process of financial contagion and to emphasize 
the main variables that could indicate financial crisis in the country. Active scientific discussion on the issues of 
analysis of financial crisis indicators is the purpose of the formulation of the objectives of this article.  
The aim of this paper is to reveal the theoretical aspects of financial contagion mechanism in the global 
financial markets and to examine the variety of different indicators that help to indicate the first signs of 
forthcoming financial crisis. 
Article objectives: to indicate the transmission mechanism and the main ways of financial crisis 
contagion, to investigate the diversity of leading indicators of financial crisis contagion and to present the early 
warning system consisted of different leading financial crisis indicators. 
Research methodology: in this article the systematic and comparative analysis of scientific literature is done, 





Mechanism of financial crisis contagion 
 
A large body of empirical literature has focused on identifying economic and financial variables that 
prior to a crisis differ significantly between crisis and non-crisis countries. The objective of these studies is to 
provide an early indication of vulnerability to a currency, banking or sovereign debt crisis or, more ambitiously, 
to predict the likelihood that a country will experience such a crisis over a given time horizon. On the whole, the 
findings of this literature indicate that fundamentals represented by various macroeconomic variables do help to 
explain the incidence and transmission of crises. Their explanatory power, especially as regards the spread of 
crises, however, has tended to be low (Berg and Pattillo, 1998). This has led researchers to broaden the scope of 
investigation from domestic macroeconomic fundamentals to other factors that may explain the temporal 
clustering of crises. These fall into several categories: common shocks, trade spillovers, and financial linkages. 
In addition, changes in investor sentiment, particularly with regard to macroeconomic and financial 
fundamentals, also play a role in inducing crises and their transmission across countries because economies with 
weaker fundamentals may be more vulnerable when others are suffering from crises.  
Common or global shocks (which has also been called a “monsoonal effect”) (Calvo et al., 1996; 
Masson, 1998), such as a rise in world interest rates, a slowdown in world aggregate demand, a decline in 
commodity prices, or changes in the bilateral exchange rates between the major world economies (particularly 
when other exchange rates are pegged to these major currencies) can play a major role in inducing pressures on 
the currencies of several countries simultaneously. In this case, the simultaneous occurrence of crises stems from 
the interaction of a common shock and domestic fundamentals. Instances of common shocks include the sharp 
increase in U.S. interest rates in the early 1980s, which was an important factor in the Latin American debt crisis, 
and the increase in world interest rates in 1994, which similarly may have played a role in the Mexican crisis of 
1994-95. Also, the large appreciation of the dollar between 1995 and 1997 and the long-lasting slowdown in 
Japanese growth are thought to have contributed to the weakening of the external sector in several Southeast 
Asian countries. 
When a country experiences a financial crisis marked by a significant depreciation of its currency, other 
countries may suffer from trade spillovers, owing to the improved price competitiveness of the crisis country 
(Gerlach & Smets, 1995, Eichengreen et al., 1996; Glick & Rose, 1999; Corsetti et al., 2000; Forbes, 2002; 
Bordo, 2008). If the exchange rate crash is accompanied, as is typically the case, by a downturn in economic 
activity and a compression of imports in the crisis country, the associated income effect would further depress 
the exports of trade partners. The price and income effects operate not only through direct bilateral trade 
linkages, but also through price competition and income repercussions in third markets. Furthermore, in view of 
the critical role played by expectations in financial markets, it is important to consider trade spillovers not only 
from countries that have already experienced an exchange rate crash, but also from those that might be subject to 
contagion effects. 
Financial linkages can be another channel for spillover and contagion effects (Goldfajn & Valdés, 1997; 
Van Rijckeghem & Weder, 2001; Marsili & Raffaelli, 2006; Hudson & Maioli, 2010). The occurrence of a crisis 
in one or more countries might induce investors to rebalance their portfolios for risk management, liquidity, or 
other reasons. For instance, when a crisis breaks out in one country, investors who have positions in that country 
will usually want to reduce their now increased risk exposure and will sell assets whose returns are highly 
variable and positively correlated with those of the assets in the crisis country. Investors may also be induced to 
sell liquid assets for other reasons, such as when the reduced value of the assets of a crisis country gives rise to 
an immediate need to raise cash to meet margin calls (Goldfajn and Valdes, 1997; Kodres and Pritsker, 1999). In 
addition, investors may sell assets that are highly represented in their portfolios simply because of their greater 
availability. Hence, a strong financial linkage with the major lender to a crisis country (in terms of being highly 
indebted to such a lender as well as being highly represented in the lender’s portfolio) would increase the 
country’s financial vulnerability (this has been labeled the common creditor argument by Kaminsky and 
Reinhart, 1998; Van Rijckeghem and Weder, 1999, for a recent detailed empirical analysis of the role of the 
common creditor). Some countries, therefore, may experience capital outflows independently of their 
macroeconomic fundamentals, simply because their assets are viewed as relatively more risky (in the wake of a 
crisis elsewhere or because they are positively correlated with those of a crisis country), more liquid, or highly 
represented in the portfolio of creditors to the crisis country. 
Shifts in investor sentiments might also play a role in the spread of crises. A crisis in one country can 
serve as a „wake-up call“, inducing financial markets to reassess other countries‘ fundamentals (Goldstein, 
1998). Countries with mediocre fundamentals or financial vulnerabilities may then be subject to contagion 
effects from a shift in market sentiment or increased risk aversion. If a currency crisis in one country generates 
fears of speculative attacks elsewhere, investors may expect to profit from speculating against currencies that 
they think other investors will also sell. The most promising targets are likely to be currencies that seem likely to 
be defended by official exchange market intervention or increases in interest rates, but that seem most likely 
eventually to collapse and yield speculative gains. The risk of a crisis precipitated by a sudden change in 
expectations is likely to be greater, the larger is the country’s share of short-term obligations and the larger is the 
maturity mismatch between assets and liabilities, because the economy will then be more vulnerable to a run by 
a fairly modest share of lenders. Low levels of international reserves in relation to the stock of short-term 
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external debt or the domestic banking sector’s liabilities may therefore signal financial vulnerability. Countries 
with weak domestic banking systems may also be at risk because financial market participants may see this as a 
constraint on the monetary authorities‘ ability (and willingness) to raise interest rates in defense of the currency. 
In order to explore the presence of financial contagion empirically, further various financial crisis 
contagion indicators should be observed and analyzed.  
 
Financial crisis contagion indicators: theoretical aspect 
 
With increasing globalization and financial integration, occurrence of financial crises and their 
transmission from one country to another become more and more arguable issue. The main field in the scientific 
literature among researches is how to determine whether a country is actually facing a crisis, isolated incidents, 
or just economic noise. Many scientists (Kaminsky et al., 1998; Berg & Pattillo, 1999; Kamin et al., 2001; 
Edison, 2003; Dermirgüç-Kunt & Detragiache, 2000; Eichengreen & Arteta, 2000; Lanoie & Lemarbre, 1996; 
Marchesi, 2003; Lestano et al., 2003; Kaminsky & Reinhart, 2009;  Reinhart & Rogoff, 2009; Rose & Spiegel, 
2009; Račickas & Vasiliauskaitė, 2012), exploring the phenomenon of financial risk contagion and herewith 
financial crisis contagion in the global financial markets, search the main indicators that could indicate the 
presence of financial crisis in the country. These researchers have quantifiably demonstrated that there are 
several indicators, each with relative correlation to the incidence of a financial crisis.      
The empirical studies summarized in Table 1 share the idea that it is possible to identify a number of 
domestic and external macroeconomic fundamental indicators as the main determinants of a financial crisis. 
Some explanatory variables are exclusive for currency crises, banking crises or debt crises; others are 
informative for more than one type of crisis. The first two columns in the table list the indicator and a brief 
summary of its economic interpretation. The last column lists the reference. 
 
Table 1. Indicators of financial crises  
 
Indicator Interpretation Reference 




A measure for the change in international competitiveness and a proxy 
for over(under)valuation. Overvalued real exchange rate is expected to 
produce higher probability of financial crisis. 
Kaminsky et al. (1998); Berg & Pattillo 
(1999); Kamin et al. (2001); Edison 
(2003); Dermirgüç-Kunt & Detragiache 
(2000); Eichengreen & Arteta (2000); 
Baig & Goldfajn (1999); Berg (1999); 
Perry & Serven (2004); Reinhart & 
Rogoff (2009); Tobin (1998) 
Export 
growth 
An indicator for a loss of competitiveness in international good market. 
Declining export growth may be caused by an overvalued domestic 
currency and hence a proxy for currency overvaluation. On the other 
hand, if export growth slows due to reasons unrelated to the exchange 
rate, this may cause devaluation pressure. In both cases, declining 
export growth can be a leading indicator for a sizeable devaluation. 
Kaminsky et al. (1998); Berg & Pattillo 
(1999); Edison (2003); Marchesi (2003); 
Berg (1999); Goldstein (1998); Reinhart 
& Rogoff (2009); Reinhart et al. (2000); 
Lestano et al. (2003) 
Import 
growth 
Weak external sector is part of currency crises. Enormous import 
growth could lead to worsening in the current account and have been 
often related with currency crises. 
Kaminsky et al. (1998); Berg & Pattillo 
(1999); Edison (2003); Berg (1999); 
Reinhart et al. (2000) 
Terms of 
trade 
Increases in terms of trade should strengthen a country’s balance of 
payments position and hence lower the probability of crisis. Terms of 
trade deteriorations may precede currency crisis. 
Kaminsky et al. (1998); Berg & Pattillo 
(1999); Kamin et al. (2001); Berg (1999); 
Dermirgüç-Kunt & Detragiache (2000); 







A rise in this ratio is generally associated with large external capital 
inflows that are intermediated by the domestic financial system and 
could facilitate asset price and credit booms. Increases in the current 
account surplus are expected to indicate a diminished probability to 
devalue and thus to lower the probability of a crisis. 
Berg & Pattillo (1999); Kamin et 
al.(2001); Eichengreen & Arteta 
(2000);Lanoie & Lemarbre (1996); 
Marchesi (2003); Berg (1999); Corsetti et 
al. (1998); Goldstein (1998); Reinhart & 
Rogoff (2009) 





Declining foreign reserves is a reliable indicator that a currency is under 
devaluation pressure. A drop in reserves is not necessarily followed by 
devaluation, central bank may be successful in defending a peg, 
spending large amounts of reserves in the process. On the other hand, 
most currency collapses are preceded by a period of increased efforts to 
defend the exchange rate, which are marked by declining foreign 
reserves. Total value of foreign reserves are also used as indicators of a 
country’s financial difficulty dealing with debt repayment. 
Kaminsky et al. (1998); Berg & Pattillo 
(1999); Edison (2003); Marchesi (2003); 
Corsetti et al. (1998); Reinhart et al. 
(2000), Lestano et al. (2003) 
 












External sector (capital account) 




Captures to what extent the liabilities of the banking system 
are backed by foreign reserves. In the event of a currency 
crisis, individuals may rush to convert their domestic currency 
deposits into foreign currency, so that this ratio captures the 
ability of the central bank to meet their demands. 
Kaminsky et al. (1998); Berg & Pattillo 
(1999); Kamin et al. (2001); Edison 
(2003); Dermirgüç-Kunt & Detragiache 
(2000); Eichengreen & Arteta (2000), 
Lestano et al. (2003) 
Financial sector 
M1 and M2 
growth 
These indicators are measures of liquidity. High growth of 
these indicators might indicate excess liquidity which may 
fuel speculative attacks on the currency thus leading to a 
currency crisis. 
Kamin et al. (2001); Berg (1999); 




An indicator associated with financial liberalization. Large 
increases in the money multiplier can be explained by 
draconian reductions in reserve requirements. 
Kaminsky et al. (1998); Berg & Pattillo 






Very high growth of domestic credit may serve as a crude 
indicator of the fragility of the banking system. This ratio 
usually rises in the early phase of the banking crisis. It may be 
that as the crisis unfolds, the central bank may be injecting 
money to the bank to improve their financial situation. 
Kaminsky et al. (1998); Berg & Pattillo 
(1999); Edison (2003); Dermirgüç-Kunt 
& Detragiache (2000); Eichengreen & 
Arteta (2000); Berg (1999); Collyns & 




Loose monetary policy can lead to currency crisis. 
Kaminsky et al. (1998); Berg & Pattillo 





Real interest rate can be considered as proxy of financial 
liberalization, in which the liberalization process itself tends to 
lead to high real rates. High real interest rates signal a liquidity 
crunch or have been increased to fend off a speculative attack. 
Kaminsky et al. (1998); Berg & Pattillo 
(1999); Edison (2003); Dermirgüç-Kunt 
& Detragiache (2000); Barro (2001); 
Berg (1999); Crotty (2009); Reinhart et 
al. (2000); Reinhart et al. (2000); Wade 




An increase of this indicator above some threshold level 
possibly reflects a deterioration in credit risk as banks are 
unwilling to lend or decline in loan quality. 
Kaminsky et al. (1998); Berg & Pattillo 





Domestic bank run and capital flight occur as crisis unfolds 
Kaminsky et al. (1998); Berg & Pattillo 






Adverse macroeconomic shocks are less likely to lead to 
crises in countries where the banking system is liquid. 
Dermirgüç-Kunt & Detragiache (1997); 
Lestano et al. (2003); Wade & Veneroso 
(1998) 





Higher deficits are expected to raise the probability of crisis, 
since the deficits increase the vulnerability to shocks and 
investor’s confidence. 
Dermirgüç-Kunt & Detragiache (2000); 
Eichengreen & Arteta (2000); Reinhart et 





Higher indebtedness is expected to raise vulnerability to a 
reversal in capital inflows and hence to raise the probability of 
a crisis. 
Kamin et al., (2001); Lanoie & Lemarbre 
(1996); Eichengreen & Arteta (2000); 




Recessions often precede financial crises. 
Kaminsky et al. (1998); Berg & Pattillo 




Burst of asset price bubbles often precede financial crises. 
Kaminsky et al. (1998); Berg & Pattillo 
(1999); Edison (2003); Baig & Goldfajn 
(1999); Barro (2001); Berg (1999); Crotty 
(2009); Goodhart (2008); Kindleberger 
(1978); Reinhart et al. (2000); Rose & 
Spiegel (2009); Sutela (1999) 
Inflation rate 
The inflation rate is likely to be associated with high nominal 
interest rates and may proxy macroeconomic mismanagement 
which adversely affects the economy and the banking system. 
Dermirgüç-Kunt & Detragiache (1997); 
Lanoie & Lemarbre (1996); Marchesi 
(2003); Berg (1999); Collyns & Abdelhak 
(2002); Reinhart & Rogoff (2009); Wade & 
Veneroso (1998) 
 
Continuation of Table 1 is at the next page  
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Domestic real and public sector 
GDP per capita 
High income countries may be less likely to reschedule their 
debt than poorer countries since the costs of rescheduling 
would tend to be more onerous for more advanced economies. 
Deterioration of the domestic economic activity are expected 
to increase the likelihood of a banking crisis. 
Dermirgüç-Kunt & Detragiache (1997); 
Eichengreen & Arteta (2000); Lanoie & 
Lemarbre (1996); Marchesi (2003); 
Barro (2001); Collyns & Abdelhak 
(2002); Reinhart & Rogoff (2009); 
Rose & Spiegel (2009) 
National saving 
growth 
High national savings may be expected to lower the 
probability of debt rescheduling. 
Lanoie & Lemarbre (1996); Lestano et 
al. (2003) 
Global economy 
Growth of world 
oil prices 
High oil prices are associated with recessions. 
Edison (2003); Lestano et al. (2003); 
Reinhart & Rogoff (2009) 
US interest rate  
International interest rate increases are often associated with 
capital outflows. 
Edison (2003); Kamin et al. (2001); 
Eichengreen & Arteta (2000); Baig & 




Higher foreign output growth should strengthen exports and 
thus reduce the probability of a crisis. 
Edison (2003); Kamin et al. (2001); 
Eichengreen & Arteta (2000); Lestano 
et al. (2003); Reinhart & Rogoff (2009) 
 
As it can be seen from the indicators list in Table 1, all the indicators are of macroeconomic 
development and external shocks. Worsening of these indicators affects the stability of financial system and may 
result in a financial crisis. All the indicators are selected by theoretical consideration as well as recent findings of 
empirical studies on financial crises. The indicators can be clustered into four major groups: 
1. External: real exchange rates, export growth, import growth, terms of trade, ratio of the current 
account to GDP, the ratio of M2 to foreign exchange reserves and growth of foreign exchange reserves. 
2. Financial: M1 and M2 growth, M2 money multiplier, the ratio of domestic credit to GDP, excess real 
M1 balances, domestic real interest rate, lending and deposit rate spread, commercial bank deposits, and the ratio 
of bank reserves to bank assets. 
3. Domestic (real and public): the ratio of fiscal balance to GDP, the ratio of public debt to GDP, growth 
of industrial production, changes in stock prices, inflation rate, GDP per capita, and growth of national saving. 
4. Global: growth of world oil prices, US interest rate and OECD GDP growth 
Seven variables are grouped as external sector indicators, five of which are related to the current 
account and two to the capital account. These variables are certainly affected not only by domestic economic 
conditions and policies, but also by global conditions such as fluctuations in the US dollar, international capital 
flows and commodity prices. The second group contains 16 indicators, nine financial indicators and seven 
domestic real and public sector variables that are partly or fully driven by economic policy. Finally, three global 
indicators reflect major economic shifts in industrial countries and movements of oil prices which may trigger a 
crisis. Some indicators are multiple crises indicators in the sense that the same indicator hints at more than one 
type of financial crises. However, it is not sure whether such a multiple crises indicator affects the probability of 
two or more types of financial crises simultaneously, or whether it triggers one type of crisis which in turn rolls 
over to a second type of crisis, and a third. Usually it is difficult to separate currency, banking and sovereign debt 
crisis. Often, these types of financial crisis are closely intertwined and escalate from one to another. For instance, 
a drop in international competitiveness may result in a currency crises as a result of which a banking crises 
evolves. Our model allows for one indicator to affect two or more types of crises. However, the rollover effect is 
not captured explicitly. 
Table 2 gives an overview of the empirical results of most of the papers on financial crises. The 
empirical papers deal with single crisis only and differ in the types of analysis: signal extraction models and 
qualitative response models. Also the time span and the frequency of the data and the number of countries 
included in the analysis differs. Some papers use a short time span and cover a lot of countries, especially Lanoie 
and Lemarbre (1996), while others cover a longer time span at the expense of a smaller country coverage. 
Berg and Pattillo (1999) and Edison (2003) use the same set of currency crisis indicators as Kaminsky 
et al. (1998) apart from global economy indicators which are included to capture external shocks. All studies 
show that real exchange rates, export growth, and the ratio of M2 to international reserves are the most important 
indicators to explain the probability of currency crises.  
Dermirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2000) consider the role of macroeconomic variables, deposit 
insurance and law enforcement in determining the likelihood of banking failure. They observe that the risk of a 
banking crisis becomes higher the lower output growth and the higher inflation, the domestic real interest rate, 
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the ratio of M2 to international reserve, and domestic credit per GDP. Eichengreen and Arteta (2000) find that 
domestic credit booms and government fiscal balance are strongly associated with banking crises. 
The most recent study on the probability of debt crises, Marchesi (2003) concludes that none of the 
indicators listed in Table 2 is significant. This result is not supported by Lanoie and Lemarbre (1996). They 
observe that the lower the rate of growth of GDP per capita and the large external capital inflows, the higher the 
probability of debt rescheduling and debt crises. 
 
Financial crisis contagion indicators: empirical aspect 
 
According to the empirical studies (Caramazza et al., 2000; Kaminsky et al., 1998; Berg & Pattillo, 
1999; Kamin et al., 2001; Edison, 2003; Dermirgüç-Kunt & Detragiache, 2000; Eichengreen & Arteta, 2000; 
Lanoie & Lemarbre, 1996; Marchesi, 2003; Lestano et al., 2003; Kaminsky & Reinhart, 2009;  Reinhart & 
Rogoff, 2009; Rose & Spiegel, 2009) countries that suffered the major financial crises appear to differ in a 
number of ways from the countries that did not face financial crisis: 
 On the external side, the appreciation of the real exchange rate during the three years prior to the 
onset of each financial crisis, a possibly proxy for loss of international price competitiveness and exchange rate 
misalignment, is almost 15 percentage points larger on average for crisis than for non-crisis emerging 
economies. For the industrial countries, the appreciation is not significantly different between crisis and non-
crisis countries.  
 The external current account deficit in the year before the crisis is also larger on average by over 2 
percentage points of GDP in crisis than in non-crisis countries for both industrial and emerging market 
economies, which may further indicate poor trade competitiveness in the crisis countries. 
 As a further indication of weak external performance, the growth of exports in relation to GDP in 
the three years before the crisis is also 11 percentage points lower on average for crisis than for non-crisis 
emerging market countries, while not significantly different for industrial countries. Other external sector 
variables, apart from short-term external debt in relation to total external debt, are insignificantly different 
between crisis and non-crisis countries. 
 Evidence of pre-crisis domestic macroeconomic imbalances that have made a country vulnerable to 
financial market contagion include slow GDP growth in the three years prior to the crisis, a high unemployment 
rate and a banking crisis. Prior to the past financial crisis, GDP growth was on average 2 percentage points lower 
and unemployment rate 4 percentage points higher in crisis than in non-crisis industrial countries. The 
differences in output growth between crisis and non-crisis countries are smaller for the emerging market 
economies. Low output growth and high unemployment may be an indicator that external or domestic 
imbalances may become increasingly untenable or that governments will be unwilling to defend exchange rate 
arrangements by implementing policies, such as raising short-term interest rates that could slow down real 
activity even further.  
 All of the industrial countries and a few emerging market economies that had a banking crisis in 
the year prior to a global currency crisis also suffered currency market pressure. Domestic imbalances in terms 
of large general government fiscal deficits or substantial monetary expansions, proxied by the growth of broad 
money (M2) to GDP, can fuel expectations of inflation and therefore lead to pressures on the currency. However, 
these variables are indistinguishable on average between crisis and non-crisis countries during the period before 
financial crisis. 
 Trade linkages as measured by the implied appreciation of the real exchange rate and the implied 
decline of export market growth induced by crises in other countries are generally significantly different on 
average between crisis and non-crisis economies. The difference between crisis and non-crisis countries with 
respect to the implied slowdown in export market growth is greatest for the emerging market economies and 
weakest for the industrial countries in the term of financial crisis. 
 Financial weaknesses or fragilities, proxied by the inadequacy of international reserves to cover 
speculative attacks, in crisis countries are significantly larger than in non-crisis ones. In particular, the ratio of 
short-term debt to international reserves in the year before crisis is almost 200 percentage points higher in 
emerging crisis economies compared with non-crisis economies. This indicates that these crisis economies were 
vulnerable to a change in investor sentiment in an unfriendly or illiquid external environment – potential source 
of financial contagion.  
The ratio of broad money (M2) to international reserves is the inverse of the extent to which liquid 
domestic liabilities of the banking system are backed by foreign exchange reserves and thus is a measure of the 
banking system’s ability to withstand currency pressures. For emerging market crisis economies, this ratio in the 
year before the crisis is 30 percentage point higher, on average, than in non-crisis economies. There are, 
however, no significant differences between crisis and non-crisis industrial countries. 
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Table 2. Explanatory variables of financial crisis 
Indicator 
Kaminsky, Lizondo 
and Reinhart (1998) 
Berg and 
Pattillo (1999) 
Kamin, Schindler and 
Samuel (2001) 














External sector (current account) 
Real exchange rate      O O   
Export growth        O 
Import growth O O  O     
Terms of trade O O   O  O  
Ratio of the current account to GDP      O  O 
External sector (capital account) 
Ratio of M2 to foreign exchange reserves      O   
Growth of foreign exchange reserves O   O    O 
Financial sector 
M1 and M2 growth         
M2 money multiplier O O  O     
Ratio of domestic credit to GDP O O  O     
Excess real M1 balance O O  O     
Domestic real interest rate O O  O     
Lending and deposit rate spread O O  O     
Commercial bank deposits O O  O     
Ratio of bank reserves to bank assets     O    
Domestic real and public sector 
Ratio of fiscal balance to GDP     O    
Ratio of public debt to GDP      O O  
Growth of industrial production  O  O     
Changes in stock prices   O  O     
Inflation rates       O O 
GDP per capita      O  O 
National saving growth       O  
Global economy 
Growth of world oil prices    O     
US interest rate    O  O   




 Common credit financial market linkages seem to be very important in explaining differences 
between crisis and non-crisis emerging market economies. The common creditor is identified by the country that 
lent the most to the first country in crisis during the term of financial crisis. The common creditor variables – that 
is, the importance of the common creditor for the borrowing country and the importance of the borrowing 
country for the common creditor in the year prior to the crisis – are significantly higher in the crisis emerging 
market economies than in the non-crisis ones. On average, the common creditor holds a 10 percentage point 
higher share of the external bank liabilities of the crisis countries than of the non-crisis countries, whereas the 
average crisis country holds a 5 percentage point higher share of the external loan portfolio of the common 
creditor than the average non-crisis country. A variable indicating mutual importance, constructed by 
multiplying the two common creditor variables, is also almost always higher for crisis compared with non-crisis 
emerging market economies.  
 The short term share of debt to BIS banks, a proxy for the maturity composition of bank liabilities, 
is also significantly higher in crisis than in non-crisis countries before the occurrence of financial crisis. 
However, the short term share of debt to BIS banks does not bear significant differences for other crises.  
 Risk management factors are proxied by stock market variability and the stock market correlation 
with the stock market of the first crisis country. Although the stock market variability is not significant, the stock 
market correlation with the stock market of the first crisis country is significantly different for crisis and non-
crisis countries. These results suggest potential market-linked transmission mechanisms for contagion, where 
creditors may rebalance their portfolios at the onset of a crisis for common creditor, liquidity, and risk 
management factors. If there are regional differences in primary creditor relationships or stock market 
correlations, these also help to explain the regional bunching of financial crises. 
The results of empirical studies indicate that once we control for domestic and external fundamentals 
and trade spillovers, financial linkages and weaknesses play a significant role in explaining the spread of 
emerging market crises, while exchange rate regimes and capital controls do not seem to matter. Thus only a 




To summarize the analysis of financial crises crisis contagion indicators, the following conclusions can 
be made: 
1. The problems induced by financial crises become more serious and significant in the context of the 
globalization and internationalization of financial markets. The financial crises in one region may adversely 
influence other regions in geographically different parts of the world, which could escalate and trigger problems 
in the whole global financial system.  
2. Over the past two decades, financial market crises with similar features have occurred in different 
regions of the world. The idea that since countries are interconnected through trade linkages, a shock originating 
in one country can be transmitted and amplified because of the pattern of interconnections in the network has 
been provided in the scientific financial literature. Unstable cross-market linkages during a crisis are referred to 
as financial contagion. 
3. There are a number of different theories why financial contagion can occur. Fundamental causes 
(including common shocks, trade linkages and certain financial linkages) and investors’ behavior (including 
liquidity problems, incentive problems, informational asymmetries, market coordination problems, and investor 
reassessment) are the main reasons why the financial risk contagion appears. 
4. Many scientists and researchers, when analyzing the phenomenon of financial risk contagion, agree 
that most crises include multiple financial contagion indicators and distinguish four different groups of 
indicators: external sector indicators, financial sector indicators, domestic real and public sector indicators and 
global economy indicators. All indicators and their observance simultaneously let both academics and politicians 
to evaluate the current economic situation and to determine if a country is struck by financial crisis or not. 
5. Although the phenomenon of financial risk contagion has been extensively investigated in the 
financial literature, it has not been studied through computational intelligence techniques that could help to 
detect contagion at an earlier stage, hence recognizing financial crises with the potential to destabilize cross-
market linkages. In the real world, such information would be extremely valuable in developing appropriate risk 
management strategies. 
6. Policy makers also need to understand the spillover effect when coordinating their efforts to 
alleviate the current crisis. For future research, it is important to better understand factors that may affect the 
dynamics of global interdependence, such as market imperfection, investors’ sentiment, and information 
efficiency. The steps that could help to strengthen individual economies and the global financial system can be 
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FINANSINIŲ KRIZIŲ SKLAIDOS INDIKATORIŲ ANALIZĖ 
 
Evaldas Račickas, Asta Vasiliauskaitė 




Finansų krizės paskutiniaisiais dešimtmečiais tapo labai dažnas reiškinys. Dėka ypatingai spartaus globalizacijos proceso, finansų 
rinkų integracijos ir jų tarpusavio sąsajų finansų krizės tampa vis globalesnės, dažnai apimančios ne konkrečią šalį, bet visą regioną ar net 
pasaulį. Krizė, kilusi vienoje valstybėje, dėl finansų krizių sklaidos kanalų netrukus išplinta ir į kitas šalis. Pastebimi finansų rinkų 
liberalizacijos, globalizacijos ir internalizacijos procesai lemia tai, jog finansinės rizikos ir finansų krizės sukeliamos pasekmės tampa vis 
labiau pastebimos ir vis skaudesnės. Vienoje šalyje kilusi krizė gali tapti rimtų problemų, kylančių kitoje šalyje ar net kitame regione, 
priežastimi. Finansų krizei tapus globalia iškyla pavojus, jog ji gali destabilizuoti visą globalią finansų sistemą. Todėl į finansų krizių kilimo 
ir jų sklaidos ypatumus būtina atkreipti kur kas didesnį ekonomistų, politikų ir rinkos analitikų dėmesį. Nors visgi ir nėra lengva patikimai 
nuspėti finansų krizės kilimą, pastaruoju metu moksliniai tyrimai vis labiau koncentruojasi į indikatorių, leidžiančių numatyti finansų krizės 
atsiradimą ir jos sklidimą iš vienos šalies į kitą, analizę. Išankstinių artėjančios krizės indikatorių analizė, besiremianti įvairiais ekonominiais 
ir finansiniais rodikliais, gali būti labai naudingas įrankis, leidžiantis pasiruošti neišvengiamai artėjančiai krizei, numatant galimą poveikį 
šalies ekonominiams rodikliams ir užkertant kelią krizės sukeliamoms pasekmėms. Šiame straipsnyje analizuojami ir sistemingai į keturias 
pagrindines grupes suklasifikuojami mokslinėje literatūroje pateikiami finansų krizės sklaidos indikatoriai. Darbe pateikiama įžvalga, jog visi 
finansų krizės indikatoriai skiriasi savo reikšmingumo laipsniu, o sisteminga jų analizė ir stebėjimas leidžia tiek akademikams, tiek 
politikams įvertinti esamą ekonomikos situaciją ir nustatyti, ar šalis yra paveikta finansų krizės, ar ne. Remiantis finansų krizių sklaidos 
indikatorių sistema galima iš anksto aptikti finansų krizės sklaidos apraiškas šalyje ir tokiu būdu iš anksto imtis prevencinių priemonių 
nepageidaujamiems finansų krizės padariniams išvengti. Be to, finansų krizių sklaidos indikatorių sistema gali būti ypatingai vertinga, 
kuriant ir vystant atitinkamas finansinės rizikos valdymo strategijas, siekiant apsisaugoti nuo neigiamo finansų krizės poveikio. 
 
 
